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While the uproar over oﬀshoring has largely subsided since the 
2004 presidential campaign, there continues to be concern and 
anxiety regarding the potential impact of oﬀshoring in general 
and services oﬀshoring in particular. With the economy softening 
and potentially headed for a recession in the midst of the current 
presidential campaign, worries about jobs and globalization seem 
likely to reemerge. 
The purpose of this policy brief is to provide estimates of the 
scope and potential impact of imports and exports of services. 
The lack of detailed data covering the service sector in general 
and trade in services in particular makes providing an informed 
estimate of the potential impact diﬃcult.1 A number of commen-
tators have provided forecasts of the potential impact of services 
oﬀshoring.2 Perhaps the most notable forecast comes from Alan 
Blinder in an interview that appeared on the front page of the 
1. For example, in the manufacturing sector oﬃcial statistical information on 
trade in goods is available for over 10,000 product categories by country. By 
comparison, unaﬃliated trade in services is reported for fewer than 30 categories 
with limited geographical detail.
2. For examples, see McCarthy (2002), Bardhan and Kroll (2003), and 
Kirkegaard (2004).
Wall Street Journal.3 Blinder suggests that as many as 40 million 
jobs could be at risk of being oﬀshored over the next two decades. 
He advances the view that American workers should specialize in 
activities that are “personal” services (i.e., activities delivered face-
to-face), because the United States is likely to lose many of the 
jobs that are “impersonal” (i.e., activities delivered at a distance) 
(Blinder 2006).
While we agree with Blinder and other commentators that 
the number of activities that can be provided at a distance, and 
are thus tradable, is large, we will argue that these other commen-
tators miss two important pieces of the story:
1. Comparative advantage suggests about one-third of tradable 
service activities are at risk of being oﬀshored to low-wage, 
labor-abundant countries like India and China.
2. The United States is currently a net exporter of services and 
likely to gain relatively high-wage, high-skill jobs through 
increased exports of services. 
By omitting these considerations, the discussion becomes 
unduly alarmist, with the policy advice (e.g., specialize in “person-
al” services) potentially misguided. 
We will present evidence that the number of jobs at risk of 
being oﬀshored to low-wage, labor-abundant countries is about 
15–20 million with many of these jobs (about 40 percent) in 
the manufacturing sector (long considered “at risk”). We will also 
present evidence that job “losses” will be oﬀset by job “gains” 
from services exporting.4 Further, we show that the jobs likely 
to be oﬀshored are relatively low-wage, low-skill jobs while the 
jobs to be gained through services exporting (and “inshoring”) 
are relatively high-wage, high-skill jobs. 
Combined, the evidence we present suggests healthy pros-
pects for American workers specializing in high-skill service 
activities, not nontradable “personal” services, because of their 
export potential and attractive wage premiums.
3. Wall Street Journal, “Pains from Free Trade Spur Second Thoughts,” March 28, 
2007.
4. Of course the aggregate number of jobs in the economy is predominantly 
determined by the size of the labor force, so jobs “lost” would be jobs lost from 
a particular ﬁrm or sector and jobs “gained” in a diﬀerent ﬁrm or sector. The 
important point is that trade does not aﬀect the number of aggregate jobs in the 
economy but is likely to aﬀect the sectoral composition of employment.NUMBER PB08-1  JANUARY 2008
2
The basis for our conclusion is a threshold (evident in 
the data) for activities that are being lost to low-wage, labor-
abundant countries in manufacturing and a similar threshold 
for activities where US exports increase in both manufacturing 
and services. 
This threshold is evidence that comparative advantage 
is indeed functioning—the United States imports low-wage, 
low-skill goods and services and exports high-wage, high-skill 
goods and services. Further, most employment in tradable 
service activities is above this threshold and thus most work-
ers in tradable service activities are unlikely to face signiﬁcant 
competition from low-wage, labor-abundant countries any 
time soon. Indeed, many of the ﬁrms and workers in tradable 
services are likely to beneﬁt from increased services trade by 
exporting. This notion is critical to understand the impact of 
services oﬀshoring on the US labor market and is explained in 
more detail below. 
This policy brief reports evidence from an ongoing project 
at the Peterson Institute, other recent studies examining the 
service sector, and recent research examining the impact of 
globalization on the manufacturing sector5 to present a more 
comprehensive picture of the likely impact of services oﬀshor-
ing on US workers and ﬁrms. It reports on a novel characteriza-
tion of “tradability” that can be applied to occupations, as well 
as to services and manufacturing industries. 
This policy brief draws the following conclusions:
x Many service activities—movie and music recording 
production, securities and commodities trading, software, 
and engineering services as examples—appear to be traded 
within the United States and thus are at least potentially 
tradable internationally. Approximately 14 percent of the 
workforce is in service industries classiﬁed as tradable. By 
comparison, about 12 percent of the workforce is in manu-
facturing industries classiﬁed as tradable. When workers 
in tradable occupations (such as computer programmers 
in the retail banking industry or medical transcriptionists 
in the healthcare industry) in nontradable industries are 
included, the share of the workforce in tradable service 
activities is even higher.
x While many service activities appear tradable, we anticipate 
that only about one-third of the jobs in these activities will 
face meaningful competition from low-wage countries (or 
risk being oﬀshored) in the medium term. 
5. While it is diﬃcult to forecast the future, one of the best guides to how 
services oﬀshoring is likely to aﬀect US ﬁrms and workers is the impact of 
imports on the manufacturing sector. This policy brief will present evidence 
that services and manufacturing are actually quite similar in a number of ways 
and, as a result, the impact of trade on the manufacturing sector is a useful 
guide to understanding the impact of trade on the service sector. 
x Tradable service jobs, such as those at engineering or 
research and development (R&D) ﬁrms, are good jobs. 
Workers in tradable service activities have higher than 
average earnings. Part of this premium is due to workers 
in these activities having higher educational attainment 
than other workers, but even controlling for diﬀerences 
in education and other personal characteristics, workers in 
tradable service activities have 10 percent higher earnings. 
Within the set of professional service industries, a worker 
in a tradable industry and a tradable occupation has earn-
ings almost 20 percent higher than a similar professional 
service worker in a nontradable industry and occupation. 
x High earnings in tradable service activities do not mean 
that these jobs will be “lost” to low-wage countries. High-
wage, high-skill activities are consistent with US compara-
tive advantage. In the manufacturing sector, it is low-
wage, labor-intensive industries like apparel that are most 
vulnerable to low-wage import competition. The United 
States continues to have strong export performance in 
high-wage, skill-intensive manufacturing industries. 
x The United States currently exports high-wage, high-skill 
services like computer software and satellite telecommu-
nications services. Most commentators on the oﬀshoring 
issue focus on the jobs that will be “lost” to oﬀshoring but 
neglect that the United States has comparative advantage 
in many service activities. Increased exports of services 
(and “inshoring”) are likely to beneﬁt many US ﬁrms and 
workers.
x As many as two-thirds of tradable business service jobs 
are skilled enough to be consistent with US compara-
tive advantage. US service workers and ﬁrms are likely 
to be beneﬁciaries of increased trade in services through 
increased export opportunities. 
x To date, there is little evidence of trade in services inﬂuenc-
ing labor market outcomes. Net employment growth in 
the average tradable service activities is roughly the same 
as net employment growth in nontradable service activi-
ties. Median wage growth in tradable service occupations 
is nearly equal to wage growth in the average nontradable 
occupation. Rates of job displacement in tradable service 
activities are no greater than nontradable service activities. 
x Many impediments exist to trade in services, ranging from 
language and cultural diﬀerences to regulation to techno-
logical barriers. These impediments are likely to protect US 
ﬁrms and workers from import competition but are also 
likely to impede US ﬁrms and workers from exporting. 
These impediments reduce the gains to the United States 
(and the rest of the world) from trade in services and the 
increased living standards that result. While potentially 
more diﬃcult than reducing tariﬀ barriers, harmonizing NUMBER PB08-1                                                                                           JANUARY 2008
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regulations and expanding mutual recognition of profes-
sional standards and accreditation are important policy 
objectives to increase the beneﬁts of trade in services. 
WHICH SERVICE ACTIVITIES ARE TRADABLE?
This question is diﬃcult to answer, due to a paucity of empiri-
cal work on the service sector in general and trade in services 
in particular. The lack of empirical work derives in part from 
the fact that the data infrastructure covering service activities 
is far less developed than that for goods. In Jensen and Kletzer 
(2006), we developed a novel methodology to identify services 
activities that are potentially tradable, using the geographic 
concentration of service activities within the United States as 
an indicator of what is traded within the United States. 
The intuition for the approach relies on a long tradition 
among economists of using the geographic concentration of 
economic activity to identify a region’s “export base” or “manu-
facturing base” (Krugman 1991, Ellison and Glaeser 1997).
The thinking is that if a region specialized in a manufacturing 
activity—e.g., airplanes in Seattle—it is likely to export this 
product in which it specializes. Seattle has a disproportionate 
share of US aircraft manufacturing employment. This industry 
concentration is not because people in Seattle consume more 
airplanes than other parts of the country; they export the planes 
in exchange for other goods and services. 
This same type of logic applies to services. Economists 
have long thought of many services as “nontradable” because 
(some) services seem to require face-to-face interaction. The 
quintessential services are personal services like haircuts or legal 
counseling. These service activities tend to be distributed in 
proportion to the population in a region (and thus we don’t see 
high concentrations of these types of service activities in one 
place). But increasingly, there are services that do not appear 
to require face-to-face interaction and thus might be tradable 
(consider accounting and architectural services). We use this 
feature to distinguish between service activities that are trad-
able and those that require face-to-face interaction (and thus 
are far less likely to be traded). 
Let’s go back to Seattle. Indeed, Seattle has a dispropor-
tionate share of US aircraft manufacturing employment (about 
nine times Seattle’s share of the population). We are accustomed 
to thinking of Seattle exporting aircraft. But, Seattle also has a 
disproportionate share of US employment in software publish-
ing (about 18 times Seattle’s share of the population). Again, 
this concentration is not because people in Seattle consume 
more software than other parts of the country; rather they 
export it in exchange for other goods and services. Software is 
a service that is traded with other regions. 
We generalize this approach to make up for the lack of 
detailed data on trade in services and identify which workers 
are exposed to services oﬀshoring by looking at services that 
are geographically concentrated and domestically traded. These 
services can be classiﬁed as potentially tradable internationally, 
and estimates can be made of the number of workers in trad-
able activities in each sector.
Using information on service employment across metro-
politan areas within the United States, we ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant 
number of service industries (and occupations) exhibit levels 
of geographic concentration consistent with the activity being 
traded within the United States.6  Figure 1 shows the geograph-
ic concentration of industries using Gini coeﬃcients.
While industries in the manufacturing sector tend to 
have higher levels of geographic concentration than the service 
sector, many service industries exhibit levels of geographic 
concentration consistent with being traded within the United 
States. In addition, the industries that do exhibit high levels of 
geographic concentration conform to our prior assumptions 
about what service activities might be tradable. For example, 
software publishing, sound recording, motion picture produc-
tion, and securities and commodities trading all exhibit high 
levels of geographic concentration. In addition, service indus-
tries identiﬁed as nontradable also conform to our notions of 
industries that are likely to be nontradable. For example, retail 
banking and video tape rental exhibit low levels of geographic 
concentration.
We conducted a similar analysis for occupations with 
results again consistent with our prior assumptions. The occu-
pational groups with large shares of employment classiﬁed as 
tradable include business and ﬁnancial operations; computer 
and mathematical occupations; architecture and engineering; 
6.  If a service is nontradable and demand for the service is concentrated (the 
industries that use the nontraded service are geographically concentrated), 
the service industry will be geographically concentrated, and the analysis 
would incorrectly infer that the service is tradable. Jensen and Kletzer adjust 
their measure of geographic concentration to correct for this possibility and 
construct region-speciﬁc measures of demand for each industry using the 
input-output use tables produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Most commentators on the offshoring 
issue focus on the jobs that will be 
“lost” to offshoring but neglect that 
the United States has comparative 
advantage in many service activities.NUMBER PB08-1  JANUARY 2008
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legal; and life, physical, and social sciences. The occupational 
groups with low employment shares in tradable activities 
require a physical presence to deliver them, and they include 
education and library; healthcare practitioners; healthcare 
support; and food preparation. 
While any methodology to identify workers potentially 
aﬀected by oﬀshoring will have shortcomings, our methodol-
ogy reﬂects facts about the actual pattern of trade in services 
within the United States and is not subject to as many “judg-
ment calls” when classifying activities as oﬀshorable or not. 
HOW MANY WORKERS ARE POTENTIALLY 
AFFECTED BY TRADE IN SERVICES?
A signiﬁcant share of total employment is in tradable service 
industries (see ﬁgure 2). For example, more workers are in trad-
able industries in the services sector than in manufacturing. 
The share of total employment in tradable professional services 
alone is 13.7 percent, while the share of employment in trad-
able manufacturing industries is 12.4 percent. Some big servic-
es sectors—education, healthcare, personal services, and public 
administration—do in fact have low shares of employment 
in tradable industries. However, because the services sector 
is much larger than the manufacturing sector, the number of 
workers potentially exposed to international trade in services is 
actually larger than the number of exposed workers in manu-
facturing. 
Moreover, we will see below that many tradable service 
activities are consistent with US comparative advantage and 
a source of high-paying jobs when foreign countries import 
from (or outsource to) US consulting, ﬁnance, marketing, and 
research activities. 
Some worker inputs into service production might be 
tradable even though the service industry itself is not (comput-
er programming or other back oﬃce operations for the retail 
banking industry). In the aggregate, the share of these sorts 
of workers—who hold tradable occupations in nontradable 
industries—is not large, at about 10 percent. However, for 
business and professional occupations, the share of workers in 
tradable occupations within nontradable industries is much 
larger. The typical professional occupation has about 25 percent 
of its employment in tradable occupations within nontradable 
industries. To the extent that ﬁrms can disentangle intermedi-
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these tradable occupations are exposed to trade, even though 
their industry is not tradable. Thus the industry results in 
ﬁgure 2 understate the share of workers potentially exposed to 
trade; the typical white-collar occupation involves an activity 
that could be either imported or exported.
WHAT DO TRADABLE SERVICE WORKERS
LOOK LIKE?
Workers in tradable sectors have higher education levels and 
signiﬁcantly higher wages compared with workers in nontrad-
able sectors and manufacturing. Across all service industries, 
workers in tradable service industries have annual earnings of 
approximately $47,000; workers in nontradable service indus-
tries have average annual earnings of approximately $30,000. 
Part of the earnings diﬀerential is due to higher education. 
Workers in tradable service industries are twice as likely to have 
a college degree and twice as likely to have an advanced degree 
as workers in manufacturing (see table 1). 
But the higher incomes are not solely a result of higher 
skill levels—even controlling for diﬀerences in skills, workers 
in tradable service activities, like engineering, R&D labs, soft-
ware publishing, and management consulting, earn incomes 
almost 20 percent higher than similar workers in nontradable 
activities in the same sector (see ﬁgure 3).
LESSONS FROM MANUFACTURING…FOR 
SERVICES
The concern about many service jobs moving overseas is driven 
in part by large perceived wage diﬀerentials between the United 
States and emerging economies like India. If software program-
mers in India earn a fraction of what software programmers 
earn in the United States, won’t all the computer programming 
jobs move to India? 
To answer this question, a comparison to manufacturing 
is again useful. We have learned quite a bit about how trade 
aﬀects ﬁrms and workers in the manufacturing sector. In manu-
facturing, large wage diﬀerentials exist between the United 
States and emerging economies like China, suggesting that all 





















Figure 2    Tradable industries’ share of employment (percent)
Source: Jensen and Kletzer (2006).
Table 1    Tradable workers with college
                    degree or higher (percent)
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Figure 3    Income premia for workers in tradable industries and occupations,
                      controlling for worker characteristics
percent difference
Note: Base group is nontradable industry and nontradable occupation.
Source: Jensen and Kletzer (2006).
is simply not happening. Comparative advantage provides the 
answer. China’s exports to the United States are concentrated 
in low-wage, labor-intensive industries such as apparel, leather 
goods, and furniture. 
Figure 4 shows that low-wage industries have higher shares 
of imports from low-wage countries as recently as 2006.7 This 
ﬁgure shows low-skill, low-wage, labor-intensive activities in 
the manufacturing sector face high levels of low-wage–coun-
try import competition. Industries with high low-wage import 
competition include apparel, leather and allied products, textile 
products, furniture and related products, and miscellaneous 
products (which include toys). High-wage, high-skill activities 
like transportation equipment, chemicals, and petroleum and 
coal products face very low levels of low-wage import competi-
tion. The only real outlier to this trend is computer and elec-
tronic equipment, which has high average wages and relatively 
high low-wage–country import competition. This exception is 
likely due to the increased fragmentation of consumer electron-
ics production where the underlying components (like semi-
7.  Figure 4 shows the share of industry imports that come from countries 
with per capita GDP is less than 5 percent of US per capita GDP plotted 
against US industry average annual wages. See Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 
(2006a) for additional information. 
conductors) that are high-wage, high-skill activities produced 
in the United States and shipped to China for low-wage, 
labor-intensive assembly. 
Figure 4 shows that manufacturing industries with aver-
age wages above roughly $40,000 face very low levels of 
low-wage import competition. This evidence suggests that 
lower-paying, labor-intensive US industries face competition 
from low-wage, labor-abundant countries. Understanding this 
low-wage–high-wage distinction is important for understand-
ing the labor market implications of manufacturing trade and 
increased trade in services. 
From 1972 to 2001, manufacturing industries that faced 
low-wage–country import competition experienced lower net 
employment growth than other manufacturing industries. 
Table 2 shows the average decade-long change in employment 
for manufacturing industries ranked by the level of exposure to 
low-wage–country import competition. Manufacturing industries 
that faced high levels of low-wage–country import competition 
have experienced large net employment losses. 
In a detailed study of the US manufacturing sector, 
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006a) examine the impact of 
import competition from low-wage countries (such as China) 
on US manufacturing plants. They ﬁnd that low-wage–country NUMBER PB08-1                                                                                           JANUARY 2008
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import shares and overall import penetration vary substantially 
across both industries and time. Both components tend to be 
higher and to increase more rapidly among low-wage, labor-
intensive industries such as apparel (as shown in ﬁgure 4). More 
capital- and skill-intensive sectors experience low levels of low-
wage import competition and have experienced no increase in 
the share of imports from low-wage countries. Manufacturing 
plant survival and employment growth are negatively associ-
ated with increased imports from very low-wage countries. 
In the low-wage, labor-intensive industries where there have 
been signiﬁcant increases in imports from countries like China, 
manufacturing plants are more likely to reduce employment 
and close (see table 2).
In addition, even for plants in the same industry facing the 
same level and type of import competition, more labor-inten-
sive plants are more likely to close and have lower employment 
growth. This trend suggests that trade with low-wage countries 
is moving US manufacturing to activities that are consistent 
with US comparative advantage—that is, toward capital- and 
skill-intensive products and production techniques. While 
potentially disruptive to both ﬁrms and workers, this height-
ened competitive pressure increases productivity—a key 
contributor to higher living standards (Bernard, Jensen, and 
Schott 2006b). All things considered, it remains the case that 
the United States maintains a signiﬁcant manufacturing pres-
ence in (and continues to export) skill- and capital-intensive 
goods like medical and scientiﬁc equipment. 
HOW WILL INCREASED SERVICE 
IMPORTS (AKA OFFSHORING) AFFECT 
THE UNITED STATES?
Based on the way low-wage–country imports have aﬀected the 
manufacturing sector, we can expect that some share of tradable 
service activities will move to other countries with workforces 
that currently have lower wages than those paid in the United 
States. Yet, we expect the activities that move to developing 
countries to be relatively lower-wage, lower-skilled activities 
(albeit sometimes in higher-end service industries, like busi-
ness services). Higher-wage, higher-skilled service activities will 
remain and provide a source of potential exports (as we discuss 
in the next section). 
Figure 4 suggests that low-wage, labor-abundant coun-
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manufacturing. Conversely the United States still has compar-
ative advantage in high-wage, capital- and technology-inten-
sive manufacturing. Figure 7 (page 11) bears this out. Figure 
8 (page 12) shows an intriguingly similar picture for service 
exports—the United States has comparative advantage in high-
wage service activities and exports relatively more high-wage 
services. 
Furthermore, we will see that all of the ﬁgures suggest that 
a notional dividing line between activities where the United 
States has comparative advantage and where low-wage, labor-
abundant countries have comparative advantage is somewhere 
around $40,000.8 Service activities that have average wages 
below $40,000 are likely to face competitive pressure from 
service imports (or oﬀshoring) from low-wage, labor-abundant 
countries. (As we argue in the next section, service activi-
ties that pay wages above $40,000 are likely to expand with 
increased trade in services.) We expect that relatively low-wage 
service activities will experience increased levels of dislocation. 
However, we do not think that the alarmist picture painted by 
some is likely to play out. 
One dimension on which services diﬀer from manufactur-
ing is the share of employment that is likely to face import 
competition from low-wage countries. An important diﬀer-
ence between tradable services and manufacturing is the share 
of employment in each sector that is in industries above and 
below that $40,000 threshold. Figure 5 shows the cumula-
tive distribution of employment in tradable manufacturing 
(NAICS 31, 32, 33) and tradable business services (NAICS 
51, 54, 55, 56). 
8.  Of course there is not an absolute threshold. Instead, the risk of facing 
import competition from low-wage, labor-abundant countries is stochastic 
and decreases with the skill of the ﬁrm’s workforce (which can be proxied by 
wages). Similarly, there is not a ﬁrm threshold for exporting but instead the 
probability of exporting increases with skills and wages. The notion of an earn-
ings threshold is a useful simpliﬁcation for the purposes of this policy brief. 
The key point from ﬁgure 5 is that the share of manufac-
turing employment in industries below the $40,000 threshold 
is almost two-thirds (about 60 percent of 13 million workers 
in manufacturing). In contrast, the share of tradable business 
service employment that is in industries with average wages 
below the $40,000 threshold is only about one-third (of 
about 15 million workers in tradable business services). These 
numbers suggest that only about one-third of tradable busi-
ness services are likely to face meaningful competition from 
low-wage countries (or oﬀshoring) in the medium term. 
The supply of educated workers with the appropri-
ate productivity—even in large countries like India—is not 
limitless, further evidence that is consistent with the notion 
that relatively high-wage service activities will stay in the 
United States. The McKinsey Global Institute suggests that 
the number of engineers and computer programmers in the 
developing world that are “multinational company ready” is 
a fraction (under 20 percent) of the total number of these 
workers and that other factors, like accessibility and domestic 
competition for this talent, will further reduce the pool avail-
able for oﬀshoring (McKinsey Global Institute 2005). Indeed, 
as reported in the Wall Street Journal, salaries for highly skilled 
computer programmers in India are now approaching those 
in the United States to the extent that some ﬁrms are clos-
ing their Bangalore oﬃces and bringing the work back to the 
United States.9
Similar to manufacturing, it is highly unlikely that a 
signiﬁcant share of high-wage, skill-intensive service activities 
will move to emerging markets in the short term and even in 
the long term. The skill-intensive, high-wage jobs in services 
are likely to stay in the United States and even grow as other 
countries open to our service exports, as we will discuss in the 
next section. Indeed, the United States is a net exporter of 
services (unlike manufactured goods) and increased trade in 
services is likely to beneﬁt US service ﬁrms and workers. 
9. Wall Street Journal, “Second Thoughts: Some in Silicon Valley begin to 
sour on India, A few bring jobs back as pay of top engineers in Bangalore 
skyrockets,” July 3, 2007. 
Source: Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2005).
  Table 2    Low-wage–country imports associated
                     with lower employment growth 
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WHAT ROLE FOR EXPORTS?
UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS SERVICE 
EXPORTS AND EXPORTERS
The United States is well-positioned to export services—a 
fact typically missing in the public discussion of oﬀshoring. 
The public conversation has gone from treating services as 
nontradable to treating services as very tradable and primarily 
importable. What is often missing from the public discussion 
is that the United States has a large positive trade balance in 
services, and many tradable service activities seem consistent 
with US comparative advantage, suggesting that the United 
States is likely to beneﬁt from increased trade in services. 
Part of the diﬃculty with any discussion of the service 
sector is its large size and diversity. To make the discussion 
manageable, we will focus on a subset of the service sector 
where direct evidence of exports is collected. The US Census 
Bureau collects information on exporting in select service 
industries, including information industries (NAICS 51), 
professional, scientiﬁc, and technical industries (NAICS 54), 
and administrative support and waste remediation industries 
(NAICS 56). 
Figure 6 presents summary statistics on the manufacturing 
sector and this “business services” sector. While these industries 
are a small subset of what many people consider the service 
sector, it is noteworthy that employment in these three NAICS 
sectors is larger than the entire manufacturing sector. 
It is also interesting to note that the “business services” 
sector presented here has average wages that are equivalent to 
the manufacturing sector.10  This subset of the service sector 
employs more people than the manufacturing sector with simi-
lar wage levels. 
The ﬁgure also reports the average wage of exporters in 
each sector. It is now well-established that manufacturing sector 
10.  The calculations reported here are based on access to respondent level 
microdata at the Center for Economic Studies at the US Census Bureau. The 
data exclude establishments (respondents) that are not mailed a form and thus 
do not report information (so-called administrative records). Nonmail cases 
tend to be much smaller than the average establishment. Nonmail cases are 
more prevalent in the “business services” sector than in the manufacturing 
sector. This exclusion does bias the results obtained from these data as a larger 
share of the “business services” sector’s very small establishments are excluded 
from the analysis than in the manufacturing sector. Average establishment 
wages calculated from published aggregates in the manufacturing sector are 
about $39,000 and in the “business service” sector they are $40,000. We use 
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Figure 5    More high-wage employment in tradable business
                      services than tradable manufacturing
cumulative share of sector employment
NAICS = North American Industry Classification System
Sources: Authors’ calculations; 2002 Economic Census. 
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plants that export pay higher wages (and have other desirable 
characteristics, too, such as higher productivity and greater 
survival probabilities). Figure 6 reports that this phenomenon 
is not restricted to the manufacturing sector. Business services 
exporters pay signiﬁcantly higher wages than nonexporters 
and higher wages than both exporters and nonexporters in 
the manufacturing sector. This evidence again points to a role 
for comparative advantage in shaping services trade. The next 
two sections present more detailed evidence on the relationship 
between services, skills, and exports. 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND 
EXPORTS ACROSS INDUSTRIES:
MANUFACTURING-SERVICES PARALLELS
In this section, we’ll start again by looking at manufacturing, 
only this time focusing on exports. In manufacturing, we know 
there is considerable variation across industries in average wages, 
capital intensity, and productivity. Apparel production tends 
to be labor-intensive and relatively low-wage, while chemicals 
and transportation equipment production tends to be capital-
intensive and high-wage. Apparel producers face high levels 
of low-wage import competition and are less likely to export 
than higher-skill, higher-wage industries, while skill-intensive 
and capital-intensive industries like aircraft tend to have higher 
exports. Figure 7 shows the relationship between industry aver-
age wages and exporting (speciﬁcally exports/worker); there is 
a strong positive relationship between industry average wages 
and exports per worker. This relationship is well-established 
and well-known for manufacturing. The results demonstrate 
that the United States exports manufactured goods from indus-
tries that are consistent with US comparative advantage—high-
wage and high-skill industries. 
 While data covering the service sector are not as compre-
hensive as those for manufacturing, for the service industries 
where there is data, the same patterns hold. Figure 8 shows the 
relationship between industry average wages and exports per 
worker for select service industries. 
Figure 8 shows that services industries with higher wages 
have higher exports per worker. Again, note that at about 
$40,000 service industries have much higher levels of exports 
per worker. This suggests that across service industries, business 
service industries that use more skilled workers are more consis-
tent with US comparative advantage and more likely to export.
These results demonstrate that the United States exports 
services from industries that are consistent with US compara-
tive advantage—high-wage and high-skill industries. Results 
discussed above suggest that “tradable” service activities in 
general are high-skill, high-earning activities. The direct 
evidence from select service industries suggests that high-
wage services are more likely to be exported. Taken together, 
these results suggest that the United States can beneﬁt from 
expanded services trade. 
Manufacturing Business services
Average wage: $35,000
Exporter’s average wage: $39,000
Figure 6   Employment and wages in business services compare
                      favorably with manufacturing
Average wage: $43,000





Sources: Authors’ calculations using 2002 Economic Census data; Manufacturing (NAICS 31–33),
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COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND 
EXPORTS WITHIN INDUSTRIES:
MANUFACTURING-SERVICES PARALLELS
The cross-industry evidence that high-skill, high-wage service 
industries have higher export participation is not the only 
evidence consistent with the United States having comparative 
advantage in high-skill, high-wage service activities. There is 
strong within-industry evidence as well. 
The desirable characteristics of exporting plants and ﬁrms 
in the manufacturing sector are now well-known. US manu-
facturing exporters pay signiﬁcantly higher wages, are more 
productive, more skill-intensive, and more likely to survive 
and grow than nonexporters in the same industry (Bernard 
and Jensen 1995, 1999, 2007, and Bernard, Jensen, Redding, 
and Schott 2007). In addition, because exporters have higher 
growth and survival rates, the growth of exporters is associated 
with a reallocation of economic activity that improves aggre-
gate productivity (Bernard and Jensen 2004). Figure 9 reports 
results from the 2002 Census of Manufactures on the desirable 
characteristics of exporters in the manufacturing sector.
Figure 9 shows that exporters in the manufacturing sector 
are larger in terms of employment and sales and have higher 
wages and higher sales per employee (i.e., labor productivity). 
The left bar for each characteristic shows the mean diﬀerence 
between exporters and nonexporters across the same sector. 
Comparing the average exporter to the average nonexporter 
across all manufacturing, exporters are over 100 percent 
larger in size than nonexporters.11 Exporters also pay about 20 
percent higher wages. Comparing the results without industry 
controls and with industry controls, we see that some of the 
eﬀect is due to variation across industries. Comparing export-
ers to nonexporters that produce in the same 6-digit NAICS 
11. The coeﬃcients reported in ﬁgure 9 are mean log diﬀerences and can be 
interpreted as the percentage diﬀerence between exporters and nonexporters, 
i.e., exporters are on average 108 percent larger in terms of employment than 
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Figure 7   Exports per worker in manufacturing rise with industry wages,
                      manufacturing (NAICS 31, 32, 33)
exports/worker (thousands of dollars)
NAICS = North American Industry Classification System
Note: The trend line is an exponential regression (y = 2.3723e–7E–05x, R2 = 0.5364) of the 
plotted data. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations; 2002 Economic Census. 
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industry, exporters are still larger, pay higher wages, and have 
more sales per employee. 
Figure 10 presents the ﬁrst evidence on remarkably compa-
rable exporter “premia” in the service sector. Like manufactur-
ing exporters, business service exporters tend to be larger in 
both sales and employment, have higher average wages, and 
have higher sales per worker than nonexporters. Comparing 
the results with and without industry controls, we see that 
much of the eﬀect is variation across industries. Exporters tend 
to be in business service industries characterized by high aver-
age wages and high labor productivity. 
Comparing exporters to nonexporters in the same indus-
try, business services exporters are almost 70 percent larger 
in employment and 100 percent larger in sales. Exporters are 
more skill-intensive, paying average wages almost 20 percent 
higher than nonexporters in the same industry. 
Establishment size is correlated with these other measures. 
Comparing establishments in the same 6-digit NAICS indus-
try, in the same state, of the same size, business service exporters 
are still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than nonexporters (the same is 
true of manufacturers). Exporters have higher sales, pay higher 
average wages, and are more productive than nonexporters. 
As seen by comparing ﬁgures 9 and 10, the business service 
exporters are diﬀerent from business service nonexporters in 
many of the same ways that exporters diﬀer from nonexporters 
in the manufacturing sector.
Similar to the worker characteristics discussed above, the 
service establishment results discussed in this section suggest 
US business service export activity tends to be concentrated in 
high-wage, high-productivity industries. Within these indus-
tries, the establishments that export tend to be larger, pay high-
er wages, and are more productive than nonexporters. These 
results suggest that tradable business services are consistent 
with US comparative advantage and, as a result, less likely to be 
vulnerable to low-wage foreign competition. On the contrary, 
they are likely to make global rivals feel vulnerable!
REMOVING IMPEDIMENTS TO TRADE
There is a growing sense that services are becoming more trad-
able, as tradable perhaps as manufactures. The data on service 
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Figure 8    Exports per worker in business services rise with
                      industry wages, business services  (NAICS 51, 54, 56)
exports/worker (thousands of dollars)
NAICS = North American Industry Classification System
Note: The trend line is a polynomial regression (y = 5E–09x2–0.0002x + 1.3732,
R2 = 0.2946) of the plotted data.
Sources: Authors’ calculations; 2002 Economic Census. 
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Figure 9    Manufacturing exporters’ advantage (NAICS 31, 32, 33)
exporter advantage
NAICS = North American Industry Classification System
Note: The bars in the chart represent regression coefficients from a regression on manufacturing-sector data of the form 
log(y) on a dummy variable identifying whether the establishment exports and the controls listed.  















Figure 10    Business service exporters’ advantage (NAICS 51, 54, 56)
exporter advantage
NAICS = North American Industry Classification System
Note: The bars in the chart represent regression coefficients from a regression on business service–sector data of the 
form log(y) on a dummy variable identifying whether the establishment exports and the controls listed. 
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establishments are less likely than manufacturing plants to 
export; while about 1 in 4 manufacturing plants export, only 1
in 20 service establishments export. Even if we control for the 
tradability measure previously discussed, service establishments 
are still about half as likely as manufacturing plants to export. 
In addition, exports to sales ratios are lower in business services 
than manufacturing. These statistics suggest that there contin-
ues to be signiﬁcant impediments to trade in services, possibly 
including culture and language diﬀerences, technological barri-
ers, or policy impediments. 
While signiﬁcant impediments to trade in services still 
seem to exist, it seems likely they will continue to diminish 
over time. The history of trade in the manufacturing sector 
provides a good indicator of how the process is likely to play 
out in services. 
Using very detailed plant-level data, Bernard, Jensen, and 
Schott (2006b) examine the impact of falling trade costs (both 
tariﬀs and transportation costs) on US manufacturers. To no 
great surprise, they ﬁnd that when trade costs in an industry 
fall, plants within that industry are more likely to close. Imports 
increase and plants close. This is an implication of trade that 
creates great discomfort. It is a fact. But the story does not end 
there. 
The researchers also ﬁnd that when trade costs fall, indus-
try productivity growth increases. This ﬁnding is important 
because productivity growth drives increased living standards.
There are a number of channels by which reduced trade 
barriers increase productivity. As mentioned above, the ﬁrst 
channel is plant closures. When trade costs fall and imports 
increase, plants close. But random plants do not close; lower 
productivity plants close. Falling trade costs and increased 
trade tend to reduce the amount of economic activity at the 
low end of the productivity distribution. These closures raise 
aggregate productivity by decreasing the market shares of the 
lower end of the productivity distribution. 
In addition, relatively highly productive nonexporters 
in industries with falling trade costs are more likely to start 
exporting. Again, this will have favorable distributional and 
aggregate productivity implications. Because relatively higher 
productivity plants are expanding, aggregate productivity will 
tend to rise. 
Furthermore, existing exporters increase their shipments 
abroad as trade costs fall. Exporters are high-productivity 
plants, and again this expansion of the high end of the produc-
tivity distribution will tend to raise aggregate productivity. 
Further, there is evidence of productivity growth within 
plants in response to decreases in industry-level trade costs. 
All of the previous channels would have increased aggregate 
productivity without any plant-level productivity growth, 
merely by increasing the share of economic activity at more 
productive producers. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott also ﬁnd 
that decreases in trade costs, and the increased competitive 
pressure associated with it, increase productivity at the plant 
level. Plants seem to respond to increased import competition 
by increasing their productivity.
Not surprisingly, given the number of channels by which 
falling trade costs shift the distribution of economic activity 
toward more productive plants and the plant-level productiv-
ity improvements associated with falling trade costs, entire 
industries experiencing relatively large declines in trade costs 
exhibit relatively strong productivity growth compared with 
other industries.
There is little reason to expect decreasing impediments to 
trade to play out any diﬀerently in the service sector. Increased 
trade in services should foster the same type of reallocation 
across industries and within industries as it has in manufac-
turing. Low-productivity service producers will be more likely 
to close; high-productivity nonexporters will be more likely to 
start exporting (and grow); and existing exporters are likely to 
increase their exports (and grow). The reallocation associated 
with these changes will tend to increase productivity in the 
tradable service sector. In addition, the increased competitive 
pressure will likely foster productivity growth within service 
producers. All of these responses to increased trade will have the 
positive impact of increasing productivity growth—and raising 
living standards—in the United States (see Mann 2003).
TRADE, EMPLOYMENT GROWTH, AND JOBS:
WHAT IS THE LABOR MARKET IMPACT 
TO DATE?
In earlier work, we reported net employment growth diﬀerences 
between tradable and nontradable service activities and found 
little diﬀerence in net employment growth rates between trad-
able and nontradable services (see Jensen and Kletzer 2006). 
We estimate the number of jobs 
at risk to offshoring to low-wage, 
labor-abundant countries is 
about 15–20 million with many 
(40–50 percent) of these jobs 
in the manufacturing sector 
(long considered “at risk”). NUMBER PB08-1                                                                                           JANUARY 2008
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Here we update our 2006 analysis with the most recently avail-
able data and also examine diﬀerences in occupational median 
wage growth rates for tradable and nontradable occupations.12
It appears that tradable and nontradable service activities (both 
industries and occupations) have similar net employment 
growth rates and similar median wage growth rates, suggesting 
that neither oﬀshoring nor exporting has yet had a signiﬁcant 
impact on the US labor market.
Figure 11a shows the average net change in industry 
employment for 1998–2004, broken out by sector and trad-
able/nontradable classiﬁcations.13 We see that tradable manu-
facturing industries experienced job losses on average, but 
tradable service industries had employment increases similar to 
nontradable service industries. 
Figure 11b shows similar employment growth rates for 
1999–200614 for occupation categories. Similar to industries, 
tradable production occupations experienced employment 
losses, but tradable service occupations had similar employment 
growth to nontradable service occupations. These statistics are 
consistent with trade in services not having had a signiﬁcant 
impact on net employment growth to date. 
We also examine average changes in median wages in 
tradable and nontradable occupations. Figure 11c shows that 
tradable service occupations have similar average median wage 
outcomes to nontradable services. These results also seem to 
suggest that trade in services has not yet had an impact on labor 
market outcomes in the United States. 
TRADE IN SERVICES AND JOB 
DISPLACEMENT
Mirroring, again, the debate about manufacturing job loss and 
trade, there is considerable current interest in potential job loss 
resulting from increasing trade in services. In our 2006 paper, 
we also reported on the incidence, scope, and characteristics of 
12. The County Business Patterns program is an establishment-based data 
collection program that uses primarily administrative data and thus has nearly 
universal coverage of in-scope establishments. For more information on 
County Business Patterns, see the US Census Bureau’s website, http://www.
census.gov/epcd/cbp/view/cbpview.html. The Occupational Employment 
Statistics program is also an establishment-based program but is collected 
through a survey instrument. For more information on the Occupational 
Employment Statistics, see the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ website, www.
bls.gov/oes/home.htm. 
13. We are constrained to use 1998 as our starting point, because it is the ﬁrst 
year that County Business Patterns was produced on a NAICS basis. The most 
recent year available is 2004. 
14.  We are constrained to use 1999 as our starting year because it is the ﬁrst 
year the Occupational Employment Survey was published on a Standard Oc-
cupational Classiﬁcation basis. 
job displacement associated with potential services tradability. 
Very brieﬂy here we report an update, using the 2006 Displaced 
Worker Survey (DWS).15
Table 3 reports job loss rates by industry for 2003–05. 
The table reports the share of workers in a sector who were 
involuntarily displaced from their jobs over the three-year 
period. Overall, about 4 percent of workers were displaced 
from their jobs over the period, with the risk of job loss lower 
in services than in manufacturing. Tradable industries over-
all had a somewhat higher risk of job loss than nontradable 
industries (5 percent compared with 3 percent). In manufac-
turing, nontradable industries had a higher rate of job loss (17
percent), compared with a tradable job loss rate of about 12
percent.16 Outside of the manufacturing sector, the nontrad-
able job loss rate was slightly higher than the tradable rate. 
Three sectors account for business services as deﬁned above: 
information services, ﬁnancial services, and professional and 
business services. In information and ﬁnancial services, the 
nontradable job loss rate was notably higher than the tradable 
job loss rate. In professional and business services, the reverse 
held. What is most notable about this sector is its overall low 
rate of job loss compared with manufacturing—even in trad-
able activities.
Parallel to our discussion of worker characteristics above, 
table 4 reports select demographic and educational charac-
teristics for workers displaced from tradable and nontradable 
nonmanufacturing industries for 2003–05, with (tradable) 
manufacturing industries oﬀered as a reference group. Kletzer 
(2001) noted that workers displaced from nonmanufacturing 
industries are slightly younger, less tenured, less likely to be 
male, and considerably more educated than workers displaced 
from manufacturing. These patterns still hold. For tradable 
15. The Current Population Survey–based Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) 
provides basic information on the scope and cost of involuntary job loss. 
The DWSs oﬀer large sample sizes, are nationally representative, and allow 
several key elements to be investigated, including the incidence of job loss; the 
characteristics of workers aﬀected; likelihood of reemployment; reemployment 
industry and occupation; and earnings changes. These surveys have been used 
extensively to study manufacturing job loss (see Kletzer 2001).
16. Analysis of the earlier three-year period, 2001–03, revealed a much larger 
tradable-nontradable job loss diﬀerence (15 percent for tradables compared 
with about 8 percent for nontradables).
We expect low-wage, low-skill 
job “losses” to be offset by high-
wage, high-skill job “gains” 
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Figure 11b   Occupation average net employment change, 1999–2006 (percent)
Figure 11c   Occupation average median wage change, 1999–2006 (percent)
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Table 3    Job loss rates by industry, 2003–05 (percent)
Industry Overall Tradable Not tradable
Manufacturing 12 12 17
Information 4 4 15
Financial services 4 3 12
Professional and business services 4 5 2
Total 46 3
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2006 Displaced Worker Survey, using sample weights.
Table 4    Characteristics of displaced workers  by industrial sector 







Educational attainment share (percent)
High school drop out 154 10
High school graduate  40 22 31
Some college 25 35 34
College + 21 38 25
On predisplacement job
Share with health 
          insurance (percent) 69 58 42
Full-time (percent) 95 85 76
If full-time, real weekly earnings $723.21$ 855.38 $605.10
Standard deviation $520.50 $573.17 $465.65
Share reemployed (percent) 67 74 66
Of reemployed, share 
      full-time (percent) 85 67           66
All reemployed
Change in ln earnings (mean)– 0.17 –0.082 –0.073
Standard  deviation   0.51  0.61 0.68
Median change –0.054 –0.028 0
Share with no earnings    
          loss (percent) 37 43 48
Note: Agriculture, mining, forestry, and construction omitted.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2006 Displaced Worker Survey, using sampling weights.NUMBER PB08-1  JANUARY 2008
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nonmanufacturing workers, just under 75 percent of displaced 
workers had at least some college experience compared with 46 
percent of displaced manufacturing workers. 
Also evident in table 4 is that for nonmanufacturing indus-
tries, workers displaced from tradable industries were more 
educated, more likely to have health insurance, more likely 
to lose fulltime jobs, and have higher predisplacement earn-
ings than workers displaced from nontradable industries. The 
educational attainment diﬀerences are stark: Forty-one percent 
of workers displaced from nontradable nonmanufacturing 
industries had a high school diploma or less compared with 26 
percent of workers displaced from tradable nonmanufacturing 
industries. The educational diﬀerences show up in predisplace-
ment weekly earnings and are consistent with the comparative 
advantage characteristics noted above. 
In terms of postdisplacement outcomes, reemployment 
rates were higher for tradable nonmanufacturing than for 
nontradable nonmanufacturing. The median change in weekly 
earnings for manufacturing workers was a loss of about 5 percent 
for 2003–05 (compared with a loss of 15 percent in 2001–03). 
Median earnings losses are smaller for nonmanufacturing than 
for manufacturing, and a larger share of nonmanufacturing 
workers experience no earnings loss. Consistent with lower 
predisplacement earnings, workers displaced from nontradable 
nonmanufacturing industries experienced smaller earnings 
losses than workers displaced from tradable nonmanufacturing 
industries. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have argued in this policy brief that the public discussion 
of oﬀshoring would beneﬁt substantially from additional facts 
and analysis. We have reported results from a number of stud-
ies and ongoing research that provide a useful framework for 
understanding how oﬀshoring and service exports are likely to 
aﬀect the US labor market going forward. 
Workers in tradable service activities are better educated 
and have higher earnings than workers in similar, nontrad-
able activities. Tradable services are higher skill and higher 
wage than nontradable activities, which suggests that they are 
consistent with US comparative advantage. Indeed, US service 
establishments that export tend to be in high-wage industries 
and within those industries pay higher wages on average, again 
consistent with the notion that the United States has compara-
tive advantage in tradable services production. 
Because the United States has comparative advantage in 
high-skill, high-wage production, the United States is likely to 
retain and indeed increase these activities in both the manufac-
turing and tradable services sectors as trade barriers diminish. 
The evidence suggests that the dividing line between 
activities where low-wage, labor-abundant countries have 
comparative advantage and high-wage, high-skill countries 
have comparative advantage is at industries that have aver-
age wages in the United States of about $40,000. While this 
threshold is not a precise estimate, all of the evidence suggests 
that this threshold is a useful way to think about the implica-
tions of trade in services. 
So, while we agree with many commentators that a signiﬁ-
cant share of employment in the United States is in activities 
that can be provided at a distance—and are thus tradable—we 
diﬀer from other commentators in our estimate of how many 
of the tradable jobs are likely to move oﬀshore. We estimate 
the number of jobs at risk to oﬀshoring to low-wage, labor-
abundant countries is about 15–20 million with many (40–50 
percent) of these jobs in the manufacturing sector (long consid-
ered “at risk”). We expect low-wage, low-skill job “losses” to 
be oﬀset by high-wage, high-skill job “gains” from services 
exporting. A fear of rapid revolutionary change resulting from 
services oﬀshoring and encouraging US workers to train for 
nontradable, “personal” service activities seems inappropriate. 
Potential notwithstanding, the evidence to date suggests 
there has been little net employment or median earnings 
impact of oﬀshoring on US service industries and occupations. 
For services, there is no discernibly higher risk of job loss in 
tradable service activities than in nontradable service activities. 
Given the share of employment in relatively low-wage indus-
tries in manufacturing (60 percent) and business services (33 
percent), we can anticipate that the risk of manufacturing job 
loss will remain higher than the risk of service sector job loss. 
It seems reasonable to expect that the process of globaliza-
tion in services will proceed much as it has in manufacturing; 
relatively low-wage, labor-intensive activities will be the most 
likely to move oﬀshore. This increased competitive pressure 
will cause dislocation to workers and ﬁrms. But higher-wage, 
skill-, capital-, and technology-intensive activities will grow 
through exports to foreign markets. Through both dislocation 
of import competing industries and exports, the globalization 
of services production is likely to have productivity-enhancing 
(and standard of living–increasing) eﬀects similar to the impact 
of globalization in the manufacturing sector. 
Our analysis here acknowledges that services oﬀshoring has 
potential to cause dislocation in the labor market (as it did in 
manufacturing), and we do not minimize the individual costs 
of job dislocation. Our intention is to provide a fuller picture 
of services trade that underscores how exports of services have 
the potential to expand high-quality services employment. 
Trade in services has the potential to contribute signiﬁcantly 
to productivity growth within the service sector in the United 
States (as increased trade contributed to productivity growth in NUMBER PB08-1                                                                                           JANUARY 2008
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the manufacturing sector). In addition to raising productivity 
in the United States, trade in services has probably even more 
potential to improve productivity in developing countries’ 
services sector, where service sector productivity is not as high 
as in developed countries. Increased trade in services oﬀers 
signiﬁcant potential to improve living standards in the United 
States and around the world. 
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